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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Validity of Statutes Prohibiting the Sale of
Goods Below Cost-The Unfair Practices Act of California prohibits the sale
of goods below cost for purposes of injuring competitors and destroying competition.1 Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant, an independent grocer, from so
selling. Held, the Act was unconstitutional because the defendant's business
was not one affected with the public interest and it therefore deprived him of
his right under the "due process" clause to control and dispose of his property. 2
Balser v. Caler, 74 P. (2d) 839 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
The Unfair Sales Act of Tennessee contains provisions substantially the
same as the California Statute.3 Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant, an independent grocer, from selling below cost. Held, that the Act was constitutional
and an injunction should issue, since it is within the police power of the state
to foster free competition and prevent the creation of monopolies.4 Rust v.
Griggs, 117 S. W. (2d) 733 (Tenn. 1938).
Price regulation in the law, both private and legislative, has traditionally
been looked upon by the courts with disfavor, either on the grounds that it is in
restraint of trade (if by private contract),5 or (if by legislation) that it interferes
with freedom of contract and the right to dispose of private property.6 The
earliest exception to the rule was with respect to businesses "affected with the
public interest", wherein such regulation was deemed a valid exercise of the
police power so long as it was not arbitrary nor discriminatory in nature.7
Comparatively recently the courts have upheld legislation permitting resale-pricemaintenance contracts insofar as they impose only a "reasonable" restraint upon
trade." In the field of direct legislative price regulation the old limitations on
i. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering Supp. 1935) Act 8781, §§ 3 and ii.

2. The California Court also held the statute unconstitutional for want of certainty in the
basis for the determination of "cost price" and for the reason that in its factual application the
Act discriminated in favor of large-scale sellers whose costs are lower. There would seem
to be little merit in the latter contention since § 6 of the Act permits sales below cost to meet
the legal prices of competitors.
3. Tenn. Acts (937) c. 69, §§ 2 and 3.
4. The Tennessee Court also held that § i (c) of its statute was not a burden on interstate commerce in prohibiting the use as a cost basis any "prices which cannot be justified
by existing market conditions within this state". It interpreted this clause to mean merely
that the seller "ini computing his cost, or purchase price, . . . cannot use as a basis some
exceptional sale price made to him, either in this state or another state, not justified by market
conditions". Instant case at 737. Cf. § 5 of the California statute.
5. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (911); Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. I (1913) ; Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8 (i18) ;
United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). See also Feldman, Legal Aspects
of Federal and State Price Control (936) 16 B. U. L. REv. 570.
6. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929); Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 12o N. J. Eq. 314, 184 AtI. 783 (Ch. 1936); Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co.,
269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936), Note (1936) 34 MIce. L. REv. 691. See also Feldman,
supra note 2, at 586 et seq. where the development of the cases on this point is thoroughly
discussed.
7. Germania Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389 (1914); Block v. Hirsh, 256
U. S. 135 (192o). This exception grew out of the case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113
(1877) (state regulation of wages of warehouse workers).
8. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936)
(upholding Illinois statute); Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. (2d) 446, 55 P.
(2d) 177 (1936) ; Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. (2d) 929 (1936) ; Bourjois
Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. (2d) 30 (937), 35 Micn. L. REv. 1369.
Many states have followed California, the initial state, in enacting these statutes, commonly
known as Fair Trade Acts. See Legis. (935) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 306, 307, n. 3. See also
Legis. (937) 51 HARV. L. REV. 336.
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the scope of the state's regulatory power have recently been attacked in Nebbia v.
New YorkY The factual holding of that case was that the State of New York
might constitutionally regulate prices in its milk industry, but from the language
that all the old
used in certain passages of the opinion it might be thought
10
The Court deconstitutional limitations on price-regulation were repudiated.
dared for example, that "affected with the public interest" meant merely "that
an industry . . . is subject to control for the public good".

The "due process

requirement" does not prevent a state from adopting "whatever economic policy
may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare

.

.. .

"; and "The courts

are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it." "- But considering the opinion as a whole and giving
careful attention to the factual holding,12 the most that can be safely said is that
the Supreme Court will no longer feel bound by formalistic definitions as to what
businesses are subject to governmental price-regulation, but will examine the
social and economic necessity of regulation in each case.'
Since the problembefore the Court in the Nebbia case was the validity of legislative action where
the impersonal forces of supply and demand were found to be inadequate in a
particular industry, it is doubtful that the holding would cover the instant statutes
which involve a blanket regulation of prices in all industries, and are premised
on a general defect in the whole economic structure.. 4 It should be noted, however, that these statutes do not undertake to fi prices at what the legislature
considers a desirable level. 5 While all industries are subject to the statutory
provisions, only those businesses will be affected which are engaged in uneconomic
practices, i. e., those selling goods below cost "for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition". 16 There would seem to be little reason
to conclude that there is a vested right to engage in such socially destructive practices, and that the prohibition of them would be a deprivation of property without
due process of law.' 7
9. 291 U. S. 502 (1934). For a few of the numerous comments on this case see Hale,
The Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on Nebbia v. New York (1934)
34 CoL. L. REv. 4o1; Notes (1934) 82 U. or PA. L. Rrv. 61g, 32 MicHr. L. Rv. 832.
1o. Cf. WILLs, CoNsniTuTioxAL LAw (1936) 788, 898; Hale, supra note 9, at 424.
II. 291 U. S. 502,

536-537.

Earlier in the opinion the Court considered at some length the social necessity of
milk as a commodity and the danger to the health of the community arising from inefficient
distribution. Id. at 516 and 530.
13. Id. at 530 and 537. Cf. Brandeis, J., dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285
U. S. 262, 301-303 (1932) ; Hale, supra note 9, at 424.
14. In this type of legislation, with respect to sales below cost South Carolina seems to
have been the quiet pioneer, having generally prohibited sales below cost of manufacture as
early as 19o2. S. C. Laws (19o2) 1059. In 1927 it extended this prohibition to include as a
cost basis the price of the commodity when bought in the open markets, plus freight charges,
12.

etc.

S. C. Laws (1927) 116.

California then followed in 1931.

See Grether, Experience in

California with FairTrade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting (1936) 24 CALIF. L. REV.
641, wherein both types of legislation are discussed and the important distinctions between the
two are pointed out. Eight other states have lately adopted similar legislation: Ariz. Laws
(1937) c. 44; Ark. Acts (1937) Act 253; Colo. Laws (i937) c. 261; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) § 4748h-I-14; Md. Laws (I937) c. 211; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1937) tit.
73, §§ 201-207; Utah Laws (1937) c. 21; Wyo. Laws (i937) c. 73.

15. Cf. Instant Tenn. case at 735.
16. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering Supp. 1935) Act 8781, § 6; Tenn. Acts (937) c. 69, § 5.
These sections also permit sales below cost in bankruptcy sales, clearance sales, etc. The
California Court construed the statute as permitting them also for general advertising purposes. Instant Cal. case at 843. The Tennessee Court came to the opposite conclusion. Instant Tenn. case at 737. For an interesting discussion of the "loss leader" problem with
respect to resale-price-maintenance contracts see Note (937) 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 549.
7. The California statute had previously been upheld by a superior court in People v.
Kahn, 60 P. (2d) 596 (1936).
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Constitutional Law-Validity of the Registration Provisions of Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935-The Securities and Exchange Commission sued to enjoin the defendant and other holding and operating companies
in its system from using the mails and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in violation of § 4 (a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of1
1935, unless they registered with the Commission in compliance with § 5.
Defendants filed a cross-bill seeking to have the whole act declared invalid.
Held, (Justice McReynolds dissenting) that Sections 4 (a) and 5 are2 separable
from the other provisions of the act, and as such, are constitutional. Electric
Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, U. S. Sup. Ct.
(1938) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 871.
4
The presence of a separability clause creates a presumption that the valid
by reason of
portions of the Act must be preserved " . . . unless their nature,
6
While it is true
an inextricable tie . . . " demands the opposite conclusion.

that if the registration provisions fall, the regulatory provisions, applying only to
"registered companies", must also fall, the court held that the former could stand
7
alone even if the latter should be held invalid. Such a result seems justified in
the light of similar publicity provisions in the Securities Act of 1933.8 While
the valid parts of a statute, after its bulk has been held invalid, may be so fragmentary that the courts will refuse to enforce them,9 no case has arisen where a
valid part has been refused enforcement before there is occasion for invalidating
the rest. Once the separability of the registration provision is established, its
constitutionality is fairly evident. Congress has the power to regulate the use
of the mails -oand channels of interstate commerce " in order to prevent transactions which it considers adverse to sound public policy. 12 This power cannot be
i. 49 STAT. 803, SI2 (1935), 15 U.

S. C. A. §§ 79, 79d (a), 79e (937).

In effect,

§ 4 (a) prohibits all unregistered holding company systems from using the mails or other

instrumentalities of interstate commerce in order to carry out their general business activities
or to buy or sell their own or other securities. Section 5 outlines the steps and information
necessary to register.
2. As the defendants had not registered, there was no real controversy involved over
those parts of the act relating to registered companies. Thus the court could refuse to give
an advisory decree on a hypothetical state of facts.
3. Affirming 92 F. (2d) 58o (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) and 18 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. N. Y. 1937).
See (938) 22 VA. L. REv. 328.
4. 49 STAT. 837 (1935), I5 U. S C. A. § 792-796 (Supp. 1937).
5. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 322 (1936).
6. For a full discussion of separability clauses, see Stem, Separability and Separability
Clauses in the Supreme Court (1937) 58 HARv. L. Rv. 76.
7. It should be noted that this provision had been held inseparable and the Act unconstitutional by one district court. In re American States Pub. Serv. Co., 12 F. Supp. 667 (D.
Md. 1935). This case was modified in Burco, Inc. v. Whitworth, 81 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A.
4th, 8936). The Supreme Court refused to review the case, probably on the grounds that no
real controversy was involved: 297 U. S. 724 (1935).
8. 48 STAT. 74 (933), i5 U. S. C. A. § 77 (Supp. 1937). The constitutionality of this
Act was upheld in Coplin v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
9. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929) ; Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
Alton R. R., 295 U. S.330 (935).
io. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288 (913) ; Badders v. United States,
24o U. S. 391 (8986) ; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 5o6 (1904). This is
subject to the Bill of Rights however. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 732 (1877). See also
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, supra at 316.
ii. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917); Associated Press v. National
Labor Relations Board, 308 U. S. 803 (937).
12. For a summary of the briefs of both sides when this case was argued before the
Supreme Court, see (8938) 5 U. S. L. WEm 579 (argument of appellees) ; 5 U. S. L. WEMr
651 (argument of Government). In respect to the use of the police power, it should be noted
that in this case the detrimental effect on the public is further removed from the use of the
chaunels of interstate commerce than it was, for instance, in the prohibition against lottery
tickets. But cf. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 299 U. S. 334 (1937).
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limited merely because the use of such channels may be incidental to the major
activities of the user.18 Nor is the holding company relationship a means to
"constitutional insulation from statutory responsibility"."- While the instant
decision is important in respect to the separability decision it must be remembered
that it is relatively narrow in respect to the scope of the Act. Its only practical
result will be to force those companies to register which have not already done
so.15 The "death sentence" clause in Section 11,1 6 requiring the holding companies to simplify their structure, is the principal part of the Act to which there
is real objection. As this cannot be attacked until an effort is made to enforce
it'17 a further test must be made before the full purpose of the Act can be accomplished.

Corporations-Right of Corporation to Plead Defense of Ultra Vires
When No Benefits Have Been Received from the Contract-Defendant, a
trading and manufacturing corporation, was called upon by a former employee
for financial aid in order to obtain hospitalization. Defendant's president notified
the hospital that the corporation would pay the hospital expense. The hospital
performed services to the amount of $361.42 and assigned the account to plaintiff
who now sues the corporation. Held (four justices dissenting), that the corporation, having received no benefits, is not estopped to plead ultra vires.1 Millett
v. Mackie Mill Co., 76 P. (2d) 311 (Wash. 1938).
Prior to the instant case Washington was the only jurisdiction which would
enforce an ultra vires contract solely on the grounds that it had been executed
on one side, regardless of whether the corporation had received benefits.2 But
the instant court expressly overruled this decision and followed the majority
rule' that the corporation must receive benefits from the performance before it
can be held liable. However, this generalization is of little value for it is impossible to tell what will be considered a benefit or even whether a "hindsight" or
"foresight" test will be used in determining whether a benefit has been received. 4
13. United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 42o (1919) ; Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S.
414 (1926).
14. See (1938) 5 U. S. L. WEEx 651; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193
U. S. 197 (1904).

15. Immediately after the decision, many of the companies notified the commission of
their intention to register. N. Y. Times, March 29, 1938, p. I, col 7.
16. 49 STAT. 82o (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79k (Supp. 1937). For a discussion of the
validity of this section, see Legis. (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 468, 493.
17. No such effort has yet been made, the Government insisting in this case that registration will in no way involve the defendant in the regulatory provisions of the Act. This
strategic presentation is discussed in (1938) 38 CoL. L. REV. 174.
X. From the facts as reported in the instant case the agreement would not seem to be a
guaranty contract, for the corporation notified the hospital it would pay for the services.
However, the court does not distinguish this from where the corporation notifies the hospital
that it would guaranty the payment, and the entire opinion is based on the assumption it was
a guaranty contract.
2. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Cascade Construction Co., io6 Wash. 478,
i8o Pac. 463 (1919). North Carolina apparently had this rule until 1935 when the court,
without discussion, seemed to require benefits to the corporation. Compare Hutchins v.
Bank, 128 N. C. 72, 30 S. E. 252 (19o) with Lentz v. Johnson & Sons, 207 N. C. 614, 178
S. E. 226 (1935).
3. Nowell v. Equitable Trust Co., 249 Mass. 585, x44 N. E. 749 (1924) ; see (935) 84
U. oF PA. L. REv. 253.
4. For a discussion of cases on these points see, 7 FLETCHER, PrvATE CORpoRAToNs
(193) § 3478; Note (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 479, 480. This is an excellent study of all
the cases involving ultra vires credit transactions.
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In some jurisdictions there is even dicta to the effect that "detriment" to the party
"benefit" to the corporation for
who has performed on his side will be sufficient
5
the soundness of the
Furthermore
contract.
vires
ultra
the
enforce
the court to
rationale behind this benefit 6rule is questionable. If the courts are interested in
protecting the shareholders, there would seem to be no reason for holding that
the receipt of benefits will validate an otherwise unenforceable contract. The
logical remedy for unjust enrichment would seem to be in quantum meruit. This
result is reached in the federal and some state jurisdictions by calling the 7ultra
vires contract void and allowing the other party recovery in quasi contract. In
view of the confusion resulting from allowing the plea of ultra vires, it is interesting to note that the states which have adopted statutes dealing with ultra vires
acts would seem to abolish the defense as between the contracting
corporate
parties.8
Labor Law-"Labor Dispute" as Defined by the Norris-La Guardia
Anti-Injunction Act-Defendant labor union picketed plaintiff's meat
markets to obtain recognition as the employee's sole agency for collective bargaining purposes.1 No employees were members of the union. Plaintiff sought
the union based its defense
to have all picketing enjoined by a federal court, and
'
(Justices Butler and
Held
Act.
Anti-Injunction
Norris-LaGuardia
on the
MciReynolds dissenting), that the injunction had been wrongfully granted,' since
a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the act was involved. Lauf v. Shinner
& Co., U. S. Sup. Ct. (938) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 735.
Defendant corporation, composed of colored persons and organized for the
mutual improvement of its members and the promotion of civil, educational,
benevolent, and charitable enterprises, picketed plaintiff's grocery store in order
to force the latter to adopt a policy of employing negro clerks in the course of
of defendant corporation.
personnel changes. No employees were members
4
Defendant pleaded the Norris-LaGuardia Act in defense to plaintiff's petition
for an injunction against further picketing. Held (Justices Butler and McReynolds dissenting), that a "labor dispute" within the terms of the act was involved5
and hence the District Court did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction.
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., U. S. Sup. Ct. (1938) 5 U. S. L.
WEEK 875.
5. See Marshalltown Stone Co. v. Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co., 149 Iowa 141, 147, 126
N. W.

19o, 192

(igio).

6. The Washington Court points out that it is requiring benefit to the corporation in
order to protect the interest of "thousands of large and small investors". Instant case at 314.
7. See cases cited in 7 FLETcERn, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 3468, 3470, 3471.
8. For a discussion of the effects of some of these statutes see, Legis. (1936) io T' p.
L. Q. 418 (Pa. Act); Note (i935) 29 ILL. L. REv. 1075 (Ill. Act).
I. For a discussion of disputes between rival unions with regard to the right to collective

bargaining apart from the Norris-La Guardia Act, see Note (1932) 46 HARv. L.

REv.

1:25.

47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ Io-115 (Supp. 1937). "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29
U. S. C. A. § 113 (c) (Supp. 1937).
3. Rev'g, 9o F. (2d) 250 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
4. Supra note 2.
5. It was a foregone conclusion that the court would hold the act constitutional, since it
had previously upheld a state statute patterned after the federal act. Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union, 3o U. S. 468 (i937) (Wisconsin Anti-Injunction Act).
2.
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In striking contrast to the mutilation accorded by the federal courts to the
Clayton Act,6 the application of which was so limited as to render it practically
ineffective,7 the instant decisions represent extremely liberal interpretations of
the scope of the new federal anti-injunction statute. It is true that, in reversing
8
the circuit court in the Lauf case, criticized in a past issue of the REVIEw, the
Supreme Court has merely followed the express terms of the Act which provides
that a "labor dispute" may exist "regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee"." But, curiously
enough, many courts in construing this and similar statutes have reached an
opposite conclusion.' 0 It is significant, therefore, that at least the federal courts
are now committed to the more liberal view. The decision in the New Negro
Alliance case extends the meaning of "labor disputes" still further. There the
corporation was a stranger to the employer and to his field of business and was
not a labor union; nor, in fact, was the control of labor one of its primary purposes. Other courts, in similar situations, have held that such demands merely
constitute a "racial dispute" and that the rules relating to labor cannot apply."
Injunctions are granted in those cases on the ground that, although the picketing
may be peaceful, it is conducive to violence because of the racial differences
involved. 1 2 However, it is questionable whether the threatened violence of race
riots is as great as the danger of disturbances where a labor union pickets a
shop, otherwise unionized, to force submission to its demands, and yet this
latter right has been upheld.' 3 Thus even if it is questionable that a statutory
"labor dispute" was involved here, the decision could have been justified on the
ground that such picketing is permissible at common law.

Mortgages-Right of Holders of Guaranteed Mortgage Participation
Certificates to Priority over Receiver of Guarantor in Distribution of Proceeds of Unassigned Mortgages-A trust company set aside certain mortgages as a mortgage pool, and sold participation certificates, payment of which
was guaranteed by the trust company. At the time that the trust company
became insolvent, the face value of the mortgages contributed by it exceeded
considerably the amount of money received from the sale of certificates, but
the liquidation of the mortgages realized an amount less than was owed to certificate holders. Held, that the receiver was not entitled to share pro rata with the
certificate holders in the distribution of the proceeds. The certificate holders
were entitled to priority in the distribution of the fund because the bank had
6. 38 STAT. 738 (914), 29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (1934).
7. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921) ; FRANKFURTER AND GREENE THE
LABOR INJT

cTION (1930)

176.

8. (3936) 84 U. QF PA. L. REV. 1027.
9. See supra note 2.
1O. For a recent collection of cases showing the split of authorities on this point, under
both anti-injunction acts and at common law, see Lipoff v. United Food Workers Union,
Phila. C. P. Ct. No. 6, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Feb. io, 1938, p. I, col. 2, at p. 6, col. 2.
See also Legis. (1936) 5o HARv. L. REV. 1295, 1298.
Ii.Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 42I, 178 Atl. iO9 (935) ; Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson,
153 Misc. 363, 274 N. Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934), 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 383 (935), 35
COL. L. REv. 121.
12. See Circuit Court decision of instant case, 92 F. (2d) 510, 514 (App. D. C. 1937);
(1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 121, 122.
13. Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); J. H. & S.
Theatres, Inc. v. Fay, 26o N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); see Note (1932) 46 HA~v. L.
REV. 125, 126. Contra: Goyette v. Watson Co., 245 Mass. 577, 14o N. E. 285 (923).
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guaranteed payment of the certificates.

In re Third and Final Account of John

E. Phillipi, Pa. Sup. Ct., March 21, 1938.
Although many states have held to the contrary,' the rule in Pennsylvania
is well established that an assignor of a part interest in a mortgage is entitled
to share pro rata with his assignee in the liquidation of the mortgage where the
assignor has not guaranteed payment of the part assigned.' On the other hand,
where the mortgagee has guaranteed payment to the assignee of the interest
assigned, two Pennsylvania cases have held that the assignee should be paid in8
full before the assignor should be allowed to reimburse 4himself for his share;
this is in accord with the majority view in other states. Although the court in
the instant case appears to have followed those cases, several considerations render questionable the fairness of the result. It is generally said that priority is
granted to the assignee in order to prevent circuity of action 5 by letting the
assignee recover his share in full out of the proceeds of liquidation, thereby avoid-6
ing the necessity of a later suit against the assignor on the latter's guaranty.
The reason for the rule of priority disappears where the assignor is insolvent
since pro rata participation by the receiver of the assignor does not permit the
guarantor "to divert a fund from a creditor to whom he owes it into his own
irresponsible pocket", 7 but merely serves to promote an equitable distribution of
the debtor's property to all his creditors. On the other hand, the court in the
instant case stated that the intent of the parties was that the certificate holders
should be given priority. In this respect it should be noted that the certificates
did not purport to pledge the unassigned interest in the pool as additional security,
and that the bank could have sold certificates up to the apparent worth of the
mortgages. Thus, it was mere chance that the face value of the mortgages
exceeded the face value of the certificates at the time of liquidation. It would
seem, therefore, that the guaranty of the bank was made on its own general
in the
credit, and not on the basis of any additional security to be maintained
8
pool. Such a conclusion was reached in a recent New Jersey case which determined that the receiver should share pro rata with the certificate holders, 9and
that the latter would have to apply as general creditors for any unpaid balance.
I. Collum v. Irwin, 4 Ala. 452 (1842) ; Alden v. White, 32 Ind. App. 671, 66 N. E. 509

(9o3), petition for rehearing denied, 32 Ind. App. 684, 67 N. E. 949 (19o3) ; McClintic v.
Wise, 66 Va. 448 (1874); Jenkins v. Hawkins, 34 W. Va. 799, 12 S. E. 1O9O (189i).
2. Donley v. Hays, 17 S. & R. 400 (Pa. 1828) (leading case) ; Perry's Appeal, 22 Pa. 43
(1853) ; Patrick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 356 (1884).
3. Fourth National Bank's Appeal, 123 Pa. 473 (1886); North City Trust Company
Case, 3:27 Pa. 356, 194 Atl. 395 (,937).

4. Preston v. Morsman, 75 Neb. 358, io6 N. W. 320 (1905) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Orr,
Tenn. 538, 289 S. W. 500 (1926) ; Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Smith, 96 S. W. (2d)
824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). See also cases collected in Note (1937) io8 A. L. R. 485.
154

S. See Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 599, 171 Atl.

83, 827 (934) ; Worrall's Appeal, 41 Pa. 524, 531 (1862).
6. New York, however, takes a contrary view, saying that the sole reason for granting
priority is to carry out the intent of the parties. See It re Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co.
of Sullivan County, 275 N. Y. 347, 354, 9 N. E. (2d) 957, 959 (1937).
7. The quoted passage is from the reason given by the court for granting the assignee
priority over a solvent assignor in Worrall's Appeal, 41 Pa. 524, at 531 (1862).
8. Kelley v. Middlesex Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 171 Atl. 823
(Ch. 1934), aff'd, 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 Atl. 706 (1934).

9. Compare the result reached under the New York view of examining only the intent
of the parties and refusing priority to the assignee where the specific intent that the parties
should share pro rata is found. People v. Lawyers Mortgage Co., 15, Misc. 744, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 390 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 617, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1o74 (1st Dep't, 1934) ;
In re New York Title & Mortgage Co., 2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 72 (App. Div., ist Dep't, 1938)
(distribution of interest). Where no such intent is found, the assignee is entitled to priority:
In re Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 275 N. Y. 347, 9 N. E. (2d) 957
(i937).
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Taxation-Constitutionality of State Privilege Tax on Gross Receipts
of Publishing Company--New Mexico levied a privilege tax on the business of publishing magazines measured by the gross receipts derived from advertising.1 Though the taxpayer's sole place of business is in the taxing state,
some of his advertisers live outside the state and his trade journal is sent interstate
to subscribers. Held, (Justices MciReynolds and Butler dissenting) that the tax
is valid. Since the business is local in nature in spite of its interstate circulation,
and since the values taxed cannot be taxed elsewhere the levy does not constitute
an undue burden on interstate commerce. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 58 Sup. Ct. 546 (1938).
In sustaining a tax which the Court without doubt considered equitable,
two arguments are stressed. The first, buttressed by the case of American Mfg.
Co. v. St. Lodis,2 proceeds on the theory that the business sought to be taxed
from
is essentially local and may be taxed though measured by gross receipts
3
In the
advertising which are perhaps enhanced by interstate subscriptions.
American Mfg. case, the business taxed was construed to be manufacturing and
hence not interstate commerce; and the tax was valid though measured by gross
receipts derived in part from interstate sales. 4 In the instant case, the business
taxed is the printing and publishing of a magazine. While the firm's assets are
confined to the taxing state, it might nevertheless be urged that since "publishing" includes notification of the public, 5 and since "public" as applied to this
case includes persons outside the taxing state, the case is governed by Fisher's
Blend Station v. Tax Commission.6 There, an occupation tax on broadcasting,
measured by gross revenues (derived largely from advertising) was declared
invalid as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, the Court stating
that broadcasting, by its very nature, transcends state lines. Although a publishing business is not inherently interstate in character, yet the circulation of the
magazine here involved did in fact extend interstate and it might be suggested
that this of itself, without the necessity of so doing, should require an application
of the Commerce Clause. 7 However, it has become apparent that traditional
formalistic distinctions between what is, and what is not, interstate commerce are
breaking down.8 Rather than draw an arbitrary line between the generation and
transmission of electricity, 9 for example, it would seem preferable to restate fundamental values in terms of a less arbitrary test. One such values has been increasingly emphasized by the courts: "interstate commerce must pay its way." 1o
It is possible that the correlative test to be employed is suggested in the Court's
second argument. It is said that the tax is not subject to the objection leveled
at taxes on gross receipts derived from interstate communication in that the values
I. N.

M. Laws 1934 (Spec. Sess.) c. 7, § :2o.

2. 250 U. S. 459 (1919).

3. Generally, a tax on gross receipts derived from interstate commerce is unconstitutional.
§ 395.
4. The American Mfg. Co. case had been considered somewhat anomalous. GAvIT, THE:

I COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924)

368.
5. "Publish" is defined as, "to make known to people in general". W.BsTER's

COi mERcE CLAUSE (1932)

INTERNATIONAL DicnioNR.x

NEW

(1927).

297 U. S. 65o (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. lO24, 84 U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 251.
3. It is interesting to note that the Court, in order to
7. U. S. CoNs?. Art. I, § 8, cl.

6.

avoid the doctrine of Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169 (1935), that a sales tax
was constitutional if the sales contract did not require interstate shipment of the goods,
assumed that the publisher's contracts with the advertisers required the maintenance of outof-state subscriptions.
8.

RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL

POWER OVER CoMMERcE (1937) 194.

9.Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. I65 (1932).
io. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 259 (1919). See Warren & Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 49.
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1
Although it is
here taxed could not be subjected to a levy by any other state.'
of taxes renders
true that the converse-that the possibility of a multiplication
2
the tax objectionable-has been frequently asserted,' it does not necessarily
follow that the absence of the objection of itself renders the tax valid. It is significant, therefore, that the Court advanced 13this argument merely as an "added
The indication seems dear, neverreason" for holding the tax constitutional.
decision of Milton Coverdale v. Arkansas
theless, in view of the subsequent
Louisiana Pipeline Co.,' 4 using language similar to that of the instant case,
that the absence of a possibility of multiple taxation will be a major factor in
sustaining the validity of taxes of this nature.

Trusts-Refusal to Construe a Purchase Money Resulting Trust
Where Wife Furnishes Money and Title is Taken Jointly with HusbandHusband with his wife's money and with her knowledge and consent bought two
pieces of property and took title jointly in the names of both.' Subsequently
the parties were divorced and husband sued for one-half the rents and profits
from the properties. The wife counter-claimed to establish a purchase money
resulting trust in the one-half interest held by the husband. Held, that the husband should recover because where title is taken jointly it indicates an intention
on the wife's part to create a tenancy by the entirety and no resulting trust can
be presumed. Rehm v. Rehm, Phila. C. P. Ct. No. 5, Phila. Legal Intelligencer,
Mar. II, 1938, p. 4, col. 3.
Since purchase money resulting trusts are enforced in order to give effect
to the presumed intention of the parties to create a trust,' a welter of rules have
been evolved to ascertain what the intention of the parties is in a given situation.
As a general rule where one party pays for property conveyed to another, a presumption of a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor.' Although if the transferee is a natural object of bounty of the payor a contrary presumption arises in
favor of a gift,4 the majority of jurisdictions together with the Restatement of
Trusts agree that a husband is not a sufficient natural object of a wife's bounty
to take a case where the wife is payor and the husband transferee out of the
ii. Cf. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 26 (1891) ("This was
a just and equitable method of assessment; and, if it were adopted by all the States through
which these cars ran, the company would be assessed upon the whole value of its capital

stock, and no more.").

12. Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232 (U. S. 1872); Philadelphia & So.
Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887). The objection would seem especially
pertinent to a tax on goods in transit. See Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies Over State Taxation (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 958, 961.
13. Instant case at 550.
14. U. S. Sup. Ct. (1938) 5 U. S. L.

WEEK

928.

i. For one of the properties, the husband at the time of conveyance paid the balance of
the purchase price with borrowed funds secured by his note. This note was subsequently
paid off by his wife. The court correctly pointed out that it was impossible for a trust to
result in this property since a purchase money trust can only result where payment is made
at the time of the purchase or prior thereto. Musselman v. Myers, 24o Pa. 5, 87 AtI. 425
(1913); see (1933)

7 TEMP. L. Q. 384.

See Scott, Resulting Trusts on Purchase of Land (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 66, 673.
3. King v. King, 281 Pa. 511, 127 Atl. 142 (1924) ; see Casciola v. Donatelli, 218 Pa.
624, 630, 67 Atl. 901, 903 (9o7) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 440.
4. Mahjoubian v. Mahjoubian, 321 Pa. 354, 184 Atl. 455 (1936) (wife transferee);
Epstein v. Ratkosky, 283 Pa. 168, 129 Atl. 53 (1925) (child transferee); RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (1935) §442.
2.
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general rule that a trust arises.5 However, the Restatement and those jurisdictions where the question has come up hold that if the title is taken jointly in the
is indicated and therefore
names of the payor and transferee no trust intention
no presumption of a resulting trust can arise. 6 The instant court followed the
Restatement, declaring that if the husband had been sole transferee then presumptively a trust would have resulted to the wife, but holding that since title was
taken jointly in the names of both husband and wife it indicated an intention on
the wife's part to create a tenancy by the entirety and therefore no resulting trust
could be presumed. While apparently no Pennsylvania court has ever been
presented with a factual situation like that in the instant case, 7 the court need not
have resorted to the distinction between the case where the husband is sole transferee and that where the husband and wife are joint transferees if it had evaluated truly Pennsylvania decision law. Although the court indicated that Pennsylvania law leans toward the Restatement view that a presumption of a resulting
trust arises in favor of a paying wife, the Pennsylvania cases do not allow a presumption of a resulting trust merely because the wife shows she has paid the purchase price, but put the burden of establishing a trust, resulting or constructive,
on the paying wife.8 The instant court's refusal to base its decision on this
peculiar Pennsylvania doctrine is perhaps justifiable for the sake of uniformity.
However, there is good reason for not extending the doctrine of resulting trusts
any more than absolutely necessary. The wisdom of allowing purchase money
resulting trusts at all has been questioned. 9 Professor Scott has pointed out
that allowing them "has led to much litigation and doubtless to much perjury" 10
and has suggested as a remedy that the presumption of a resulting trust merely
because one person pays the purchase price should be abolished and the burden
of proving a trust was intended put on the payor.11

Trusts-Savings Account in Tentative Trust Not Subject to an Inheritance Tax-The deceased transferred, by a formal writing, his savings
account "in trust" for his two sisters. He notified them of his action, but retained
possession of the pass books and made additional deposits and withdrawals.
Subsequently, the deceased became mentally incompetent and died without regaining competency. Held, that the deposit funds were not subject to an inheritance tax, because the original transfer, in setting up a tentative trust, created
an immediate interest in the beneficiaries which, in the absence of subsquent
5. See i PERY,

TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) 194; Scott, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 682; RESTATE(1935) § 442, comment a. Some states have established the presumption by
statute. GA. CODE ANN. (1933) § io8-1o6; MONT. REv. CODE (1935) § 6785; N. D. Comp.
LAws (1913) §5365; OELA. STAT. (1931) §1180.
6. Doyle v. Doyle, 268 Ill. 96, io8 N. E. 796 (1915); Masters v. Masters, 222 Ky. 427,
3oo S. W. 894 C1927) ; Haguewood v. Britain, 273 Mo. 89, 199 S. W. 950 (1917) ; Milligan
v. Bing, io8 S. W. (2d) io8 (Mo. 1937) ; Wise v. Raynor, 2oo N. C. 567, 157 S. E. 853 (1931) ;
Eagle v. McKown, 105 W. Va. 27o, 142 S. E. 65 (1928). See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935)
§ 441, comment e.
7. Instant case at p. 4, col. 3.
8. Crawford v. Thompson, 142 Pa. 551, 21 Atl. 994 (1891) ; Lloyd v. Woods, 176 Pa. 63,
34 Atl. 926 (1896) ; Beringer v. Lutz, 179 Pa. I, 37 Atl. 640 (1897) ; Olinger v. Schultz, 183
Pa. 469, 38 At. 1024 (1898) ; Cornman's Estate, 197 Pa. 125, 46 Atl. 94o (19oo); Byers v.
Ferrker, 216 Pa. 233, 65 At. 62o (1907) ; Orr v. Orr, 22 Pa. Dist. 887 (9).
9. See Ames, Constructive Trusts Based Upon the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of
Land (19o7.) 20 HARv. L. REV. 549.
i0. Scott, op. cit. supra note 2, at 710.
xi. Several states have statutes to this effect. Ky. STAT. (Baldwin, 1936) §2353;
MicH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 12973; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8o86; N. Y. CONSOL.
§§ 231.07, 231.09.
LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 5I, § 94; WIs. STAT. (931)
mENT, TRUSTS

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

revocation by the depositor, was made absolute as of the time of transfer or of
last withdrawal. In re Mines, 31 Pa. D. & C. 153 (C. P. 1938).
The inheritance tax aspect of the tentative trust doctrine, although considered
for the first time in Pennsylvania in the instant case, has been previously litigated
in New York, the home of this anomalous doctrine.1 The decisions on point in
that state are not easily harmonized. Generally, however, the recipient of a fund
under a tentative trust is held subject to a succession tax, 2 since for that purpose the transaction is considered a testamentary disposition whereby interest
passes to the recipient upon the death of the depositor. But, the opposite result
is sometimes reached in New York where the court finds that the depositor has
given notice of the trust form of the deposit to the beneficiary, 3 or has delivered the pass book to the latter. 4 Under such circumstances the trust is conclusively deemed irrevocable and the analogy of a gift inter vivos, under which title
passes presently, is used.' All considered, the law on this taxation angle of the
doctrine is still unsettled. 6 The instant Pennsylvania court predicated its holding
that the funds were not subject to inheritance taxation upon the theory that an
"immediate interest" in the money vested in the beneficiaries at the time the deposit was set up "in trust". It would seem that the court, in adopting this theory,
was misled, as was the federal district court in Kardon v. Willing7 by the unfortunate language of the tentative trust rule stated in the Restatement of Trusts,
which it cited." In any event, it is submitted that an unrealistic result was reached
in the instant case. As was suggested in a recent issue of the REVIEW, 9 problems
i. Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (19o4).
2. In re Barbey's Estate, 114 N. Y. Supp. 725 (Surr. Ct. 1908) ; Matter of Halligan, 82
Misc. 30, 143 N. Y. Supp. 676 (Surr. Ct. 1913) ; In re Palm's Estate, 148 N. Y. Supp. io44
(Surr. Ct. 1914) ; In re Bender's Estate, 182 N. Y. Supp. 217 (Surr. Ct. 195) ; Matter of
Kiernan, 134 Misc. 868, 237 N. Y. Supp. 290 (Surr. Ct. 1929) ; GLEASON & OTIS, INHERITANCE TAXATION (4th ed. 1925) 365; Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (193o) 43 HAgv.
L. Rrv. 521, 543, n. 58; Notes (1927) 49 A. L. R. 864, 897, (1930) 67 A. L. R. 1247, 1257.

nan,

3. Matter of Reed, 89 Misc. 632, 154 N. Y. Supp. 247 (Surr. Ct. 19,5) ; Matter of Bren92 Misc. 423, 157 N. Y. Supp. 141 (Surr. Ct. 1915); GLEASON & OTIS, loc. cit. supra

note 2.

4. Matter of Pierce, 132 App. Div. 465, 116 N. Y. Supp. 816 (4th Dep't, 19o9); In re
Reynold's Estate, 163 N. Y. Supp. 803 (Surr. Ct. 1916).
5. The better view is that notice and delivery of pass book are but mere indications of
intention, only presumptively, rather than conclusively, creating an irrevocable trust.
The fact that notice was given to the beneficiaries in the instant case might justify the
conclusion reached by the court under the rule of some of the New York cases. Supra note
3. The court was of the opinion that, in view of the formal writing transferring the account,
the deceased may never have had the right to revoke the trust, although the decision was not
based on this. Instant case at 157. Notwithstanding, the subsequent deposits and withdrawals made by the deceased strongly indicate his intention to retain complete control over
the fund, and consequently, his intention to set up a tentative trust.
The subsequent insanity of the depositor would not affect the revocability of the trust,
for during his insanity the court would revoke on his behalf if the equity of the situation
warranted it. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Smart, 161 Misc. 857, 293 N. Y. Supp. 823 (Surr. Ct.
1937).

6. So confused are the courts as to the proper basis for deciding question under the
tentative trust doctrine, that it surprises little to find that within recent years one New York
Surrogate's Court, in Matter of Kiernan, 134 Misc. 868, 237 N. Y. Supp. 290 (Surr. Ct.
1929), declared that regardless of notice or delivery of pass book to the beneficiary the deposit is taxable, whereas another, in the case of In re Henderson's Estate, 198 N. Y. Supp.
799 (Surr. Ct. 1923), held that under no condition was the deposit subject to the tax.
7. 20 F. Supp. 471 (E. D. Pa. 1937), 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 321 (1938).
8. (1935) § 58. See (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 321, 322, n. 9. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania in Pozzuto's Estate, 124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 Atl. 209 (1936), 85 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 646 (1937), apparently was also misled by the Restatement, for after citing section 58, it
said: "the deposit was 'in trust' and an immediate interest arose in the donee, subject only to
revocation by some unequivocal act. . . ." (Italics added.)
9. (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 321.

RECENT CASES

arising under the tentative trust doctrine should be approached with the purpose
of that doctrine fully in mind.10 The evasion of inheritance taxes, where the
settlor loses no actual control over the fund before his death, was certainly not the
intended result. Moreover, to subject tentative trusts to these taxes would be
consistent with the more enlightened view that in any case under the doctrine
the beneficiary acquires no interest in the savings account fund until the death of
the depositor or until the "trust" is otherwise made irrevocable.11

Trusts-Use of Trust Funds for Purchase of Corporate Stock Where
Trustee is Not Limited to Legal Investments--A_ trust was created by will
in an estate which included in its assets shares of stock of private corporations.
The trustees were given power ". . . to retain, obtain, hold, invest and re-invest
in any securities or investments, and they shall not be confined to such securities
or investments as are known or considered lawful and valid securities or investments for trustees in Pennsylvania ....
" 1 Exercising due skill and prudence,
the trustees purchased common stock of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
which subsequently depreciated in market value. Certain of those entitled to
the present income of the trust filed exceptions to the account of the trustees,
challenging the trustees' right to make such a purchase for the trust estate. Held,
on dismissing the exceptions, that, under the terms of the will, the trustees might
invest in shares of stock of private corporations, provided only that they use
common skill, prudence and caution. In re Wood's Estate, 197 At. 638 (Pa.
Super. 1938).
This very problem, under a similarly worded provision in the will, was thoroughly discussed by the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County in Carwithen's
Estate.2 The conclusion there reached, which was in accord with the instant
case, was approved in a former issue of the REvraw 3 as achieving an economically
sound result, in line with the trend of modem authority. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to decide the case on its merits, ruling that no
proper case had been presented for a declaratory judgment.4 The instant case,
therefore, constitutes the first appellate court decision in Pennsylvania construing
"investment" to include corporate stocks, and permitting a trustee, when legislative restrictions are waived by the settlor, to diversify the trust investments
io. Tentative trusts have been called "poor men's wills". Testamentary disposition of
comparatively small sums of money without the necessity of fulfilling the requirements for a
formal will and of resorting to probate proceedings, plus the retention by the depositor of complete control over the funds during his lifetime characterized the tentative trust as the doctrine was orginally conceived.
ii. Cf. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 58, comment a. But ef. Scott, op. cit. supra note
2, at 543.
The general question should be compared with the analogous problem of the taxability
of revocable trusts. Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924); Stimson, When
Revocable Trusts Are Subject to an Inheritance Tax (1927) 25 MIcH. L. REV. 839; Notes
(1927) 49 A. L. R. 864, (I93O) 67 A. L. R. 1247.
i. Instant case at 640.
28 Pa. D. & C. 66 (1937).

A companion case, ruling the same way, was Donovan's
Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 93 (1937). While the language in the will in the instant case might
be said to constitute a more complete and explicit waiver by the settlor of legislative restrictions on the power of the trustees than the language in the above two cases, the instant court's
reasoning was substantially similar to that of the Orphans' Court, and no emphasis was placed
on the broad language. The determinative words were similar in all three cases, and it is
believed that no justifiable distinction could be made.
3. (1937) 85 U. oF PA. L. REV. 647.
4. Carwithen's Estate, 327 Pa. 490, 194 Atl. 743; 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. i1o (1937).
2.
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by including corporate securities, without assuming the liability of an insurer.
With close scrutiny by the courts, and with the requirement that trustees exercise
prudence in investment, the rule established by the instant court must be unqualifiedly approved.

Wills-Testamentary Character of Lease Providing for Passage of
Title to Lessee at Lessor's Death-An instrument was executed in which
Murphy agreed to lease to the Young Men's Christian Association a tract of
land suitable for a boy's camp. The lessee was to pay taxes and to construct
certain buildings and playgrounds, and if it failed to do so, or if it ceased to be
a going concern, the lease was to terminate. Otherwise the lease was to continue
until the lessor died or until a guardian or trustee was appointed over the lessor's
estate. In either of these events, his executor or guardian was empowered and
ordered to transfer the title to the lessee. The lessor died and the lessee petitioned for a decree directing the executor to deliver a deed to the land. Held, (four
justices dissenting 1) that as no present interest passed under the instrument,
it was testamentary in character, and the land should go to the residuary legatees
under the lessor's will. In re M1urphy's Estate, 75 P. (2d) 916 (Wash. 1938).
Both sides of the court agreed that the instrument to be effective must pass
a "present interest" in the land and not merely direct what should be done after
the lessor died. 2 As may be suspected, such a broad general principle is difficult
to apply in borderline cases, no case having been found in which any rules for its
determination have been laid down.' But the majority's construction in the instant case seems to be at complete variance with the terms of the instrument
as well as the intent of the maker. 4 This is the first time that the instant court
has been confronted with such an instrument, although similar cases have arisen
in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.' In both those cases, a lease for the life of the
lessor contained a clause giving the lessee the option to purchase the land at the
lessor's death, and in both cases the agreement was enforced, the Pennsylvania
court indicating that the payment of rent alone would be sufficient consideration
i. The chief dissent is printed as the majority opinion in the previous hearing of the
instant case. 71 P. (2d) 6 (Wash. 1937). The complete shift was caused by the retirement
of Justice Tolman of the previous majority, and the appointment of Justice Simpson who
joined the previous minority.
2. ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) § 64; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 467.
Tiffany criticizes the phrasing of the rule as "suggesting that the distinction depends on the
character of the interest which passes rather than on the time at which it is to pass." Neither
side of the court regarded the lessee's rights as a tenant as a sufficient interest.
3. Atkinson explains the rule by stating the results obtained in specific cases, loc. cit.
supra note 2. Although the minority in the instant case held that an interest passed, they did
not say what the interest was or by what rules it was determined.
4. In the instant case, the lessor was a lawyer, and drew the instrument himself. His difficulty was obvious. He wanted the lessee to have the land, but he did not want to make an
outright gift in case the lessee should become bankrupt. The lessee did not want to make
permanent improvements relying merely on a will which could have been revoked at any time.
It was clearly expressed in Paragraph 24 of the instrument that there was a ". . . sufficient
consideration for the passage of title . . . and said transfer or passing shall not be regarded as a gift or devise . . .". Instant case at 918-19.
It was conceded that if no present interest passed, the instrument was testamentary.
This would exclude the possible construction of the instrument as a contract to make a will.
Although the intent to do so was not expressed, it would not seem impossible to imply such
intent. Cf. Keefe v. Keefe, 19 Cal. App. 310, 125 Pac. 929 (1912); Velikanje v. Dickman,
98 Wash. 584, 168 Pac. 465 (1917).

5. Specht's Estate, 268 Pa. 384,

Eq. 681, 95 Atl. 358 (Ch. 1915).

112

Atl.

92

(1920);

Smith Co. v. Anderson, 84 N. J.

Cf. Meek's Appeal, 97 Pa. 313 (1881).
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for the passage of title.6 An examination of the lease in the instant case shows
an express promise to convey title to the lessee, either at the death of the lessor,
or at the time of appointment of a guardian or trustee over the estate, the consideration being the services and expenditures by the lessee as well as the taking of
the lease.7 While the lessor could control certain details in the lessee's enjoyment,
he could not regain full control by any volitional act of his own, and thus the
instrument could hardly be called ambulatory. The lessee's interest was subject
to defeasance only by his own act against his own interest; this would seem to
distinguish the case from some of those cited in the majority opinion." The death
of the lessor does not determine when an interest passes to the lessee, but is
merely the date on which the lessee is deemed to have fully performed, and on
which the contract becomes executed on both sides. Moreover, it is difficult to see
how an instrument which was intended under certain circumstances to act as
a conveyance in the lifetime of the "testator" could be considered testamentary.-"
However, while the instant decision seems arbitrary in the light of these considerations, the real difficulty lies in the inconclusive nature of the law in this field
and the uselessness of asking whether a present interest has passed when that
test is so inadequately defined.
6. ".

.

. the possession of the property and the performance of the agreement by Wag-

ner [lessee] during the lifetime of the decedent [lessor] vested in him an equitable title and
the agreement was not thereafter revocable . . .". Specht's Estate, 268 Pa. 384, 389, 112
Atl. 92, 94 (192o).

Cf. Ogle's Estate, 97 Wis. 56, 72 N. W. 389 (1897).

7. Paragraph 24 of the lease, instant case at 918-19.
S. Especially in those cases where the conveyance is conditional on the grantee surviving
the grantor. Young v. O'Donnell, 129 Wash. 219, 224 Pac. 682 (1924), cited in the instant
case at page 923-24. Tiffany gives the holding in the Young case as the minority. Loc. cit.
supra note 2. Cf. Christ v. Kuehne, 172 o.118, 72 S. W. 537 (1903).
9.It was provided that if a trustee or guardian was appointed over the lessor's estate,
or if the lessor attempted to sell or encumber the estate, title would pass to the lessee at that
time. This fact was not considered in the majority opinion.

